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Body-worn cameras and transparency: Experimental evidence
of inconsistency in police executive decision-making ∗
Brandon Tregle
University of Nebraska Omaha
Justin Nix
University of Nebraska Omaha
Justin T. Pickett
University at Albany, SUNY
Body-worn cameras (BWC) have diffused rapidly throughout policing as a means of promoting transparency and accountability. Yet, whether to release BWC footage to the public remains largely up to the
discretion of police executives, and we know little about how they interpret and respond to BWC footage
– particularly footage involving critical incidents. We asked a nationally representative sample of police
executives (N=476) how supportive they were of legislation that would mandate releasing BWC footage
upon request as public information, and presented them with an experimental vignette about BWC capturing one of their officers fatally shooting an [armed/unarmed] [Black/White] suspect. Results indicated
inconsistency in executives’ attiudes and decision-making: (1) less than one-third of executives supported
such legislation, (2) suspect race and armed/unarmed status shaped how executives felt media would cover
the incident and whether they would state publicly that the shooting was justified, and (3) agency size conditioned the effects of armed/unarmed status on executives’ perceptions.
Keywords: body-worn cameras, transparency, experiment, media, officer-involved shootings

Introduction
As video recording technology evolves and diffuses throughout society, officer involved shootings (OIS)
are more likely to be captured on camera. Approximately 48% of all law enforcement agencies utilize body
worn cameras to record interactions between officers and citizens (Hyland, 2018). In addition, over 80%
of U.S. adults have smartphones capable of recording (Pew Research Center, 2019). Video surveillance of
police officers has become part of a larger push for accountability and transparency. When controversial
OIS are captured on camera, executives face a difficult decision: they must balance the integrity of the
ongoing investigation against public demand for release of the footage, among other calls for transparency.
They may similarly be concerned with the optics of the video, and whether the public and/or media might
misinterpret or overreact to the footage (Nix & Pickett, 2017). The widespread use of video recording
technology means that police executives are faced with these difficult decisions more frequently than ever
before.
∗
Forthcoming at Justice Quarterly (accepted 9/3/2020). We appreciate Brad Campbell’s help in conceiving the original
idea for this project, and in developing an earlier version of the vignette, which was administered to a different sample in 2016.
Replication files are available on the second author’s Github account (http://github.com/jnixy). Corresponding author: jnix@
unomaha.edu.
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Using footage of a critical policing incident, such as a shooting, to determine what happened is not
easy. Interpretations are inherently subjective (Mourtgos & Adams, 2019), and police executives are likely
to consider this when communicating with the public in the aftermath. Unfortunately, we know very
little about police executives’ views about transparency. We do not know whether they generally support
releasing BWC footage to the public. We do not know whether they believe certain situational features
of a critical incident increase the likelihood of misinterpretations or negative publicity. We do not know
whether features of the situation influence their willingness to release BWC footage, provide details about
the suspect and officer involved, meet with the family of the deceased, or answer questions about whether
the shooting was justified. Finally, we do not know how agency characteristics affect police executives’
decisions about transparency.
The goal of the current study is to begin to provide answers to these questions by adding to a growing
body of research on police executives’ perceptions of new tactics, strategies, and public-relations issues.
For example, recent research has explored their views on organizational priorities (Matusiak, 2019), militarization (Turner & Fox, 2019), organizational justice (Wolfe et al., 2018), and evidence-based practices
(Telep & Winegar, 2016). Using experimental data from a recent, nationally representative survey of police executives in the United States, we analyze how agency characteristics and situational factors jointly
influence police executives’ expectations for how the media will cover OISs and their transparency-related
decision-making. We also examine police executives’ global support for releasing BWC footage.
Body-Worn Cameras in Policing: Effects and Public Support
When ~4,000 law enforcement agencies were asked as part of the 2016 Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey why they acquired BWCs, approximately three-fourths cited
the following reasons: reduce civilian complaints, improve evidence quality, reduce agency liability, and
improve officer/agency accountability. Other common responses included to improve community perceptions (57%) and to simplify incident review (50%). On the flipside, 68% of agencies that had not adopted
BWCs cited concerns about being bombarded with public records requests and the cost associated with
video redactions (Hyland, 2018). These straightforward responses clearly indicated that agencies have
had to weigh potential gains in transparency and accountability against the tangible costs associated with
outfitting their officers with BWCs. Fortunately, unlike past technological innovations in policing, the dif-
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fusion of BWCs has been accompanied by a wave of evaluation research that has aided our understanding
of the effects of BWCs on policing.
To date, approximately 70 empirical studies have been released which provide evidence regarding the
effects of BWCs on officers’ behaviors and attitudes, citizens’ behaviors and attitudes, investigations, and
various organizational outcomes. On the one hand, survey research has generally found that officers are
receptive to BWCs (Gaub et al., 2018; W. Jennings et al., 2014; White et al., 2018) because they see BWCs
as a form of protection against citizen allegations of misconduct (Goetschel & Peha, 2017; Owens & Finn,
2018; Pelfrey Jr. & Keener, 2016). Indeed, with a few exceptions (Ariel et al., 2015; White et al., 2018),
most studies have demonstrated that officers wearing BWCs received significantly fewer complaints than
officers not wearing them (Ariel et al., 2017; Braga et al., 2018; Katz et al., 2014). On the other hand,
community surveys indicate that the public is supportive of agencies outfitting their officers with BWCs
because they see it as a way to hold police more accountable for disparities in stops, arrests, and uses
of force (Sousa et al., 2018; Todak et al., 2018). Interestingly, then, both parties see BWCs as a way to
hold the other more accountable (White & Malm, 2020). Yet, evidence concerning the effects of BWCs
on organizational outcomes (e.g., policies, training, accountability) is scant. Based on their review of the
evidence, Lum et al. (2019) concluded that “[e]xpectations. . . surrounding BWCs among police leaders and
citizens have not yet been realized by and large in the ways anticipated by each” (p. 93).
Surprisingly, we know comparatively little about the effects of BWCs on police organizational processes and after-the-fact decision making on issues pertaining to BWCs. For example, the 2016 LEMAS
survey suggested approximately 14% of agencies using BWCs did not have a written policy pertaining to
BWCs, and even among those that did, just 54% included language stipulating when raw footage of incidents can be publicly released (Hyland, 2018). Meanwhile, the National Conference of State Legislatures
indicates that just 23 states and the Districts of Columbia have legislation pertaining to BWC data and
open records laws. Often, these laws allow agencies to exempt themselves from FOIA requests if footage
relates to ongoing investigations.1 Thus, in many jurisdictions, what agencies do with BWC footage is a
matter of executive discretion. Agencies can take great strides (or endure great setbacks) in transparency
following critical incidents like OIS being recorded by BWCs. Quickly releasing footage might be wise
from a public relations standpoint, but might be challenging due to the need to make redactions and protect the integrity of ongoing investigations. The alternative is to delay or refuse to release footage, which
1

See http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/body-worn-cameras-interactive-graphic.aspx#/.
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might be interpreted by the community as a sign the agency is hiding something egregious – as was the
case in Chicago following the shooting of Laquan McDonald (Husain, 2019). Unfortunately, we lack a clear
understanding of what influences executive decision making in instances like these, and about whether
decisions vary across agency contexts.
Police Executives’ Decisions About Transparency
Theoretically, both agency characteristics and the specific situational features of a BWC-recorded OIS may
be associated with police executives’ anticipation of media hostility and willingness to communicate with
members of the community – including the family of the deceased. First, it seems likely that the size of
the agency involved in the shooting will be relevant, as BWCs have diffused more rapidly throughout
larger agencies, which are responsible for policing large cities (Hyland, 2018). Large cities are home to a
disproportionate share of Americans, as well as serious index crime, and decades of empirical evidence
indicates that police shootings are correlated with community violence (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Klinger
et al., 2016; Liska & Yu, 1992; MacDonald et al., 2001; Sorensen et al., 1993). Thus, in large cities, the
sheer number of police-citizen interactions that occur on a day-to-day basis far exceed those that occur in
smaller jurisdictions – and they are more likely to be recorded by officers’ BWCs. Because large agencies
have led the way in terms of adopting BWCs, it is likely that they have more experience dealing with
controversial incidents being recorded. Indeed, they may even have clearer policies in place for how to
proceed in the aftermath of such incidents (White & Fradella, 2017; White & Malm, 2020). Because of their
greater experience with BWC, our first hypothesis (H1) is that executives serving large agencies (defined
as those employing 100+ sworn officers) will be more supportive of legislatively mandated transparency
with the public following a controversial BWC-captured OIS.
Second, at least two situational variables are likely salient to police executives as they decide what
steps to take in the aftermath of such an event: the race of the citizen involved and whether he or she
was armed. In recent years there has been substantial academic and political debate over the (implicit
or explicit) role of citizen race in officers’ decision-making – especially regarding the use of deadly force
(Edwards et al., 2019; Goff et al., 2016; James et al., 2016; Nix et al., 2017; Ross, 2015). On the one hand,
the findings from many prior studies (e.g., Fryer Jr, 2016) are uninterpretable because they condition on
mediator variables (stops, arrests, or fatal shootings), which biases the relationship between citizen race
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and outcomes of interest (Knox & Mummolo, 2020; Ross et al., 2018). Yet on the other hand, studies that
calculate police-involved fatality rates for groups based on their share of the general population may not
be making “apples to apples” comparisons, and many factors in addition to police decision-making could
be contributing to observed disparities (Edwards et al., 2019; Schwartz & Jahn, 2020). The problem is that
police administrative data only includes citizens who were stopped, but to test for racial bias, researchers
also need to know who police observed and chose not to stop (Alpert et al., 2005; Goldstein, 1960; Knox
& Mummolo, 2020). Ultimately, large-scale comparative BWC data would help researchers estimate both
encounter rates and disparities in shootings, less lethal force, or other outcomes such as verbal disrespect
(Voigt et al., 2017).
Media scrutiny and public outrage stemming from several police-involved deaths of unarmed Black
men has led to formation of advocacy groups like Black Lives Matter, the first Presidential Task Force
on Policing since the late 1960s, and empirical exploration of whether police morale has taken such a
blow that officers are policing less vigorously (Devi & Fryer, 2020; Mac Donald, 2017; Marier & Fridell,
2020; Pyrooz et al., 2016; Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019; Wolfe & Nix, 2016). For example, researchers have
uncovered evidence of “de-policing” in Baltimore (Morgan & Pally, 2016; Morgan et al., 2020), Chicago
(Arthur & Asher, 2016), and the state of Missouri (Shjarback et al., 2017) following the death of Freddie
Gray, the release of the Laquan McDonald video, and the death of Michael Brown, respectively.2 In a
national survey of nearly 8,000 police officers conducted in 2016, 72% of responding officers said they were
“less willing to stop and question people who seem suspicious” (Pew Research Center, 2017). Line-level
and command-level officers also express frustration with how the media portrays law enforcement, and
concern about an increased willingness among citizens to challenge police authority (Nix & Pickett, 2017;
Nix et al., 2018).
Research has found that victim characteristics influence news coverage of violence (Bjornstrom et al.,
2010; Lin & Phillips, 2014), because media outlets focus on stories that are attention grabbing, emotionally
charged, and consonant with broader themes (Surette, 2011). Given the intense public concern with police
killings of Black citizens and the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement, it seems likely that OIS
involving Black suspects will garner greater scrutiny form the media. In OIS involving Black citizens, then,
2

See also “Weekly Crime Reports” at https://www.atlantapd.org/i-want-to/crime-data-downloads. In the first 12 weeks of
2020, Atlanta police officers averaged more than 3,300 traffic stops per week. Even while residents were ordered to stay at home
and businesses were closed due to COVID-19, officers never made fewer than 1,000 stops in a week. Yet, from 6/14/2020 to
6/20/2020 – the week immediately following the shooting of Rayshard Brooks – they made just 50. Arrests similarly plunged
following the Brooks shooting.
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the public-relations challenge for police executives is to dispel notions of obscuration, evidence suppression, or cover up. Theoretically, then, OIS involving Black citizens should increase executives’ concerns
with demonstrating transparency. Considering this, we hypothesize that when controversial OIS caught
on BWC involve Black citizens, police executives will (H2) expect media coverage of the incident to be
more negative. Furthermore, (H3) the involvement of a Black citizen in an OIS incident captured on BWC
will likely affect the importance executives place on communicating with the public.
Although police shootings of unarmed individuals sometimes are legally justified, they may nevertheless engender frustration and outrage from members of the public, who may not use the same legal
standards to judge them (Alpert & Smith, 1994; Klinger & Brunson, 2009; Shane & Swenson, 2018; Selby
et al., 2016). Indeed, the public appears to use a simple weapon heuristic to judge OIS, whereby OIS involving unarmed citizens are unjustified. Officers are keen to this reality, and believe the public does not
understand their work—especially the intricacies of deadly force incidents (Bartels & Silverman, 2005; Pew
Research Center, 2017).
In this media environment, the public-relations challenge police executives face is that legal use-offorce standards, which focus on officers’ threat perceptions, are difficult to explain to the public and are
unlikely to be persuasive, because of their complexity and ambiguity. In addition to community expectations, police use of force is regulated by a complex intersection of Constitutional standards, state laws,
and agency policies (Stoughton et al., 2020). Further complicating matters, encounters involving police use
of force are dramatized by the media and the frequency with which they occur is exaggerated (Marenin,
2016). Thus, for an OIS involving an unarmed citizen, any publicity may equate to bad publicity – at least
in the eyes of police executives. For these reasons, we hypothesize that executives will (H4) expect media coverage of an OIS involving an unarmed citizen to be more negative, but (H5) be less supportive of
communicating with the public in the aftermath.
The Current Study
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, we assessed how supportive a nationally representative
sample of municipal police executives (N = 476) were of a law that would require them to release BWC
footage upon request as public information. Then, to test our hypotheses regarding how executives would
perceive and react to a critical incident captured on BWC, we presented the sample with an experimental

6

vignette about one of their officers responding to a home invasion call and fatally shooting the suspect.3
Policing scholars increasingly are using experimental vignettes to study decision-making (Darwinkel et
al., 2013; Hine & Murphy, 2019; Nix, Pickett, & Mitchell, 2019; Phillips, 2009; Phillips, 2020), and for good
reason. For example, McLean et al. (2020) recently used experimental vignettes involving a suspicious
person call to assess the impact of a social interaction training program in two agencies. Although vignettes are cross-sectional and treat effects as one-shot phenomena (Gaines et al., 2007), research shows
that decision-making in hypothetical vignettes parallels that in real world situations (Hainmueller et al.,
2015; Pogarsky, 2004), and is less susceptible to social desirability bias than direct questioning (Auspurg
& Hinz, 2014). We thus randomized the suspect’s race (White or Black) as well as whether he was armed
(handgun or cellphone), resulting in a 2x2 full factorial design. Respondents were then asked (1) how they
believed media coverage would portray the incident, as well as how important or unimportant it would be
to (2) state publicly that the shooting was justified or (3) communicate with the public about the incident in
additional ways (e.g., releasing information about the incident, making formal media statements). Before
presenting our findings, we briefly review our methodology in the following section.
Method
Data
Data for this study come from a survey administered to a national probability sample of police executives
in early 2018. We obtained the mailing address for 12,039 municipal police departments from the National
Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators. Using a sampling strategy similar to that used by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics for its Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS)
survey, we placed each agency into one of four strata based on the number of sworn officers they employed
(i.e., 0 to 24, 25 to 49, 50 to 99, and 100 or more).4 A random sample of 624 agencies was drawn from each
stratum which resulted in a stratified random sample of 2,496 departments.
We used a modified Dillman et al. (2009) method to elicit participation in the study. In February 2018,
3

We described a home invasion in the vignette after consulting with police officers during pilot testing. The officers noted
that a home invasion in progress would likely involve dispatch relaying information from the 911 caller, and that officers would
approach it with a sense of urgency due to the rather uncommon nature of the call.
4
Generally speaking, small agencies serve less populous jurisdictions than large agencies. The “100 or more officers” cutoff is
common in police surveys (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). We use it for the largest stratum because of concerns about statistical power.
Roughly 40 agencies report having 1,000 or more officers, and only another ~150 agencies have more than 250 officers (Hyland &
Davis, 2019). This means we would have needed to survey every agency with 250+ officers and achieved a 60% or better response
rate in order to have sufficient power to detect medium-sized effects.
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we pre-notified each agency in our sample with a postcard addressed to the chief executive. The postcard
informed them of the survey they would soon receive in the mail, but also included a link to an online
version if they preferred to take the survey at that time. We requested that the chief executive complete
the survey, or some other high-ranking, command-level officer if the chief was unavailable. One week later,
we sent a survey packet to each chief executive in our sample (containing a cover letter, questionnaire, and
self-addressed, postage-paid return envelope). Respondents were again given the opportunity to complete
the survey online if they preferred. Finally, two weeks later we mailed another survey and reminder letter
to agencies that had not yet responded. We received 675 surveys (369 by mail and 306 online), resulting in
a 27% response rate, which falls within the normal range for mail and online police surveys (Nix, Pickett,
Baek, et al., 2019).5 While the response rate is lower than we hoped, survey methodologists caution against
using “minimum acceptable” response rate benchmarks (Groves, 2006; Peytchev, 2013). Further, research
demonstrates that survey response rate and non-response bias are only weakly correlated (Peytchev, 2013;
Pickett, Cullen, et al., 2018).
Global Outcome Variable: Support for Releasing BWC Footage
Our first outcome measured executives’ global attitudes toward releasing BWC footage (Nix et al., 2020).
Specifically, we asked executives to indicate the extent they would “support or oppose a law that would
require agencies to release BWC footage upon request as public information” (1=strongly support to
5=strongly oppose). Responses were reverse coded so that higher scores indicated greater support.
Independent Variables
During the survey, each executive randomly received one version of the following factorial vignette:
While on patrol, officers from your agency are dispatched to a home invasion in progress
in a residential area. The caller describes the suspect as a [Manipulation A] male. One of
your officers arrives on-scene and makes contact with a [Manipulation A] male who fits this
description in front of the house. The suspect has his hands in his pockets and does not comply
with your officer’s commands to show his hands. The suspect then quickly removes his hands
5

We removed two ineligible respondents (who did not work for a municipal agency) and eight respondents who failed to
provide enough information to determine the stratum from which they were sampled. For the purposes of our analyses, we
restricted the sample to Chiefs (including Interim and Acting Chiefs), which reduced the sample size to N = 476.
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from his pocket holding an object. Your officer fires at the suspect, killing him on the scene.
Afterward, the officer finds that the object was a [Manipulation B]. The officer’s BWC captures
full audio and video of the incident.6
Manipulation A was the suspect’s race (White or Black) and Manipulation B was whether he was armed
(handgun) or unarmed (cellphone). We randomized the factor levels for both, by using random numbers to
assign vignettes to agency addresses within each stratum before mailing the questionnaires. These factors
serve as independent variables predicting the situational outcomes discussed below.7
Experimental Outcome Variables
Anticipated media coverage. After reading the vignette, executives were asked whether media coverage of
the shooting would be: (1) positive or negative, (2) fair or unfair, (3) truthful or untruthful, and (4) reliable
or unreliable. For each question, executives were asked to answer on a five-point item-specific response
scale (e.g., 1=very positive to 5=very negative). Factor analysis indicated the four items loaded onto a
single factor (eigenvalue = 2.84, loadings > .77), so we averaged responses to the items to generate a mean
index (α=.91).
State justified. We next asked executives to consider the vignette and indicate how important they felt
it would be (regardless of law or policy) for the agency to state publicly that the shooting was justified (1
= very unimportant to 5 = very important).
Additional communication. Our third situational outcome measured the importance executives placed
on additional communication with the public in the aftermath of the OIS. Specifically, we asked respondents to indicate how important it would be (regardless of law or policy) for the agency to: (1) release the
video to the public within 48 hours, (2) release demographic information about the involved officer, (3) use
social media to keep the community updated on the shooting as details unfold, (4) make a statement to the
6

Surprisingly, national data on officer-involved shootings, disaggregated by the agencies involved and/or their respective
populations, are hard to come by. Nix et al. (2017) reported that 68% of fatal shootings in 2015 involved departments with fewer
than 1,000 full-time officers (p. 323). Analyzing seven months of shootings reported by The Washington Post, Sherman (2018)
found that the majority of fatal police shootings – 51% – occurred in communities with fewer than 50,000 residents, and 70%
occurred outside of major cities. Similarly, according to Mapping Police Violence, 74% of police-involved fatalities from 2013 to
2019 occurred outside of the 100 largest U.S. cities (see https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/cities). Finally, Edwards et al. (2018)
showed that two-thirds of all police killings happen in suburbs, smaller cities, and rural counties.
7
Response rate did not vary as a function of these manipulations. The response rates for each treatment condition were as
follows: White suspect 27.8%, Black suspect 26.12%; armed suspect 26.84%, unarmed suspect 27.08%. Our experiment achieved
good balance—respondent characteristics (gender, race/ethnicity, and education) and agency use of body-worn cameras were very
similar across experimental groups. Additionally, the sample mirrors the population of local police chiefs in terms of race/ethnicity
(91% White) and gender (96% male); see Hyland and Davis (2019)). See Tables A1-A3 in the supplemental appendices.
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media regarding the shooting within 24 hours, and (5) send someone to meet with the suspect’s family to
discuss the incident. The five items loaded onto a single factor (eigenvalue = 1.31, loadings > .43), and as
such, we averaged responses to create a mean index (α=.64).8
Analytic Strategy
Two of our outcomes were continuous mean indices and one was ordinal. Research suggests linear probability models are appropriate in experiments for categorical outcomes (Gomila, 2019; Huang, 2019). To
test our hypotheses, we estimated linear regression models and used randomization inference to conduct
hypothesis tests (Gerber & Green, 2012; Keele et al., 2012).9 Randomization inference is an exact test of
the sharp null hypothesis of no effect, which is based on random assignment within the finite sample,
rather than on large sample theory. It requires no parametric distributional assumptions, is valid with
non-normally distributed outcomes, in the presence of outliers, and regardless of sample size (Gerber &
Green, 2012). Because we tested our hypotheses across each of four strata, the false positive rate is inflated.
As such, we use a Bonferroni-corrected alpha threshold of .0125.10
Results
Figure 1 breaks down executive support/opposition for legislation that would require agencies to release
BWC footage upon request as public information. Across each stratum, approximately half of the executives opposed or strongly opposed such legislation, whereas only 24 to 30% indicated support or strong
support. The remaining 22 to 23% in each stratum were neutral, expressing neither support nor opposition. The distribution of responses across the four strata were statistically indistinguishable (Pearson’s χ2
= 10.991, p = .53), suggesting that agency size is not associated with support or opposition for this type of
legislation. Therefore, our first hypothesis was not supported.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
8

We also performed each factor analysis separately for each stratum. In each stratum, the items used to create the anticipated
media coverage and additional communication scales loaded onto a single factor and exhibited adequate internal consistency.
We also re-estimated our regression models using weighted factor scores instead of mean scales for these two outcomes. Results
were substantively similar (see Tables B1 and C1 in the supplemental appendices).
9
We estimated supplemental models for the ordinal outcome using ordered logistic regression. The results were substantively
similar (see Table D1 in the supplemental appendices).
10
When testing interactions in the full sample, where the four strata are combined, we do not use this Bonferroni corrected
alpha.
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Turning attention to the experimental portion of the analysis, Table 1 displays the effects of our two
randomized factors (Black/White and armed/unarmed suspect) on three outcomes (anticipated media, state
justified, additional communication) within each of the four strata. We will discuss each factor in turn.
In the smallest agencies (0-24 sworn), the suspect’s race did not significantly influence chief executives’
concerns about media hostility, willingness to state publicly that the shooting was justified, or willingness
to engage in additional dialogue about the incident with the community. The same was true of executives
in the third stratum (50 to 99 sworn). However, suspect race did have a significant effect on the decisionmaking process of chief executives in agencies with 25 to 49 officers and those in agencies with 100 or more
officers. On one hand, chiefs serving agencies with 25 to 49 officers anticipated greater media hostility if
the suspect was Black (b = .326, p = .006). On the other hand, chiefs serving the largest agencies indicated
that media coverage would be less hostile if the suspect involved was Black (b = -.223, p < .000). Here, we
found partial support for our second and third hypothesis.
Regarding our second randomized factor – the armed/unarmed status of the suspect – we found it
did not have a significant effect on any of the outcomes we measured in the smallest and largest agencies.
However, in the two middle strata, results indicate it influenced executives’ concerns about media hostility
and willingness to state publicly that the shooting was justified. Taken together, these findings indicate
partial support for our fourth and fifth hypotheses. Among agencies with 25 to 49 officers, executives
expected greater media hostility if the suspect pulled a cellphone, as opposed to a firearm, from his pocket
(b = .314, p = .008). Moreover, and perhaps unsurprisingly, they expressed significantly less willingness to
state publicly that the shooting was justified if the suspect had a cellphone (b = -.836, p < .000). A similar
pattern of findings emerged among chiefs serving agencies with 50 to 99 officers. They expected more
hostile media coverage (b = .427, p = .002), and were less willing to state publicly that the shooting was
justified (b = -.692, p = .001), if the suspect had a cellphone.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
A key finding, then, was that the effects of the randomizations on some of our outcomes – notably
anticipated media hostility and state justified – varied by agency size. Inspection of the coefficients for the
variable unarmed suspect across the strata suggests its effect on anticipated media hostility may increase
linearly with agency size. Conversely, its effect on willingness to state publicly that the shooting was
justified appears non-linear, with the most substantial impact on executives serving agencies in the two
11

middle strata. To test for these possibilities, we combined the four strata into a single, full sample and
created an interaction terms, unarmed*agency size, where agency size was an ordinal variable ranging
from 1 (0 to 24 officers) to 4 (100 or more officers). We then estimated ordinary least squares regression
models for two outcomes: anticipated media hostility and state justified. Using the margins command in
Stata (version 15.1), we plotted adjusted predictions for the effect of unarmed suspect on each outcome, at
each of the four strata (i.e., the interaction between unarmed suspect and agency size in the full sample).
The results are depicted in Figures 2 and 3.11
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
In the first model predicting anticipated media hostility, the coefficient for the interaction term unarmed*agency size was positive and statistically significant (b = .265, p < .000). As shown in Figure 2, the
difference in anticipated media coverage if the shooting involved an armed suspect relative to an unarmed
suspect grows larger with agency size. In the second model predicting state justified, the coefficient for
the interaction term unarmed*agency size was negative and statistically significant only at the second and
third categories of agency size (b = -.809, p = .001 and b = -.669, p = .011, respectively). In Figure 3, the effect
of unarmed suspect on willingness to state publicly that the shooting was justified is most pronounced in
the second stratum (25-49 officers), less pronounced in the third stratum (50-99 officers), and statistically
nonsignificant in the largest stratum (b = -.362, p = .204). With these findings in mind we next discuss the
implications of our work in light of its limitations, and provide directions for future research.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Discussion
The push for police departments to adopt BWCs has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of
agencies utilizing them, with approximately half of all departments equipping their officers with BWCs as
of 2016 (Hyland, 2018). Unlike previous technological innovations that have diffused throughout policing
before empirical evidence could catch up, the proliferation of BWCs has been accompanied by a simultaneous explosion of research on their effects. Since 2012, over 70 BWC evaluation studies – many in the form
of randomized controlled trials – have been published (Lum et al., 2019). The evidence is decidedly mixed,
11

Model fit statistics (adjusted R2 , AIC) support the decision in the interaction models to treat agency size as ordinal for
anticipated media and as categorical for state justified.
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but collectively suggests that in some contexts BWCs can be beneficial to both officers and citizens (Malm,
2019). However, the current study is the first, to our knowledge, to explore law enforcement executives’
perceptions about transparency issues surrounding BWC-recorded OIS. Given that many of the demands
for BWCs stem from the expectation that BWCs will increase transparency (President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, 2015; White & Malm, 2020), it is imperative to understand the attitudes and perceptions
of the individuals who control the footage and make decisions about its release. Additionally, we explored
how factors like suspect characteristics and media coverage – those outside of the executives’ control –
might influence their decision making in the aftermath of an OIS captured on BWC. The results of our
various hypothesis tests are summarized in Table 2.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The results indicated that less than one-third of executives in our sample supported legislation that
would mandate the release of BWC footage upon request as public information. Contrasting our first
hypothesis, we found similar levels of support among executives at both small and large agencies. The
finding that only a small minority of executives at all agency types support mandatory release of BWC
footage indicates that they are not fully on board with transparency. Instead, executives appear to be on
board with transparency only when they can decide on a case-by-case basis exactly how transparent they
want to be. Such case-by-case decision making is the very problem that transparency reforms are designed
to address. A key takeaway, then, is that if policing is to become more transparent, and if BWC footage is to
increase accountability through open access, then the impetus for moving beyond case-by-case decisionmaking will have to come from outside of policing, most likely from legislators.
According to National Conference of State Legislatures (2018), twenty-seven states do not currently
have laws pertaining to how BWC footage must be addressed under open record laws. Even in the states
that do, there are usually built-in exemptions that allow agencies to deny FOIA requests (e.g., if the footage
pertains to an ongoing investigation). Thus, public release of BWC footage is often left to the discretion of
the Chief of Police or Sheriff in many jurisdictions. However, in response to calls for police reform (Bazelon,
2020; Chang, 2020) following the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota, some cities and
states have introduced legislation that mandate the release of BWC footage within a prespecified number
of days (New York City Hall, 2020; Colorado State Senate SB 20-217, n.d.). As a result, the decision to release
footage no longer rests with department executives in these areas. To the extent that a uniform response
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by police departments following a critical incident is desirable, and in light of our findings that executives’
want the option to withhold BWC footage and that their willingness to exhibit transparency varies across
OISs types, such legislation is exactly what is needed.
In the meantime, our results suggest that executives believe there are at least some situations in which
withholding BWC footage from the public is acceptable and/or necessary. Otherwise, they would have no
issue with laws that mandate releasing footage. One possibility is that they are concerned with how certain
types of BWC footage will make their agencies look. Another more benign explanation is that they may be
concerned about the costs associated with dedicating human resources to review and redact BWC footage
when public records requests are made (White & Malm, 2020). Currently, many jurisdictions are permitted
to charge citizens a fee for releasing BWC footage as part of a public information request in order to offset
cost. For example, in Washington, state law RCS 42.56.240(14) allows local agencies to charge citizens for
“reasonable costs of redacting, altering, distorting, pixelating, suppressing, or otherwise obscuring any
portion of the. . . recording prior to disclosure.” Similarly, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
charges $48 per hour for the processing of a BWC recording to redact confidential information.12 Simply
put, some chiefs may be fearful that their agencies would bear the brunt of the financial burden associated
with laws that mandate the release of BWC footage (Hyland, 2018). Moving forward, qualitative research
is needed to help understand why chiefs do or do not support such legislation. Future research could
also explore executives’ views about whether it is necessary to withhold certain types of footage from the
public, and if so, what they are.
Turning to the experimental component of our study, we found that the effects of suspect race and his
armed/unarmed status on executives’ decision-making varied with agency size. Most notably, as agency
size increased, executives became more likely to believe that OISs involving unarmed suspects would result
in negative publicity. In this respect, we found partial support for our fourth hypothesis that executives
would expect media coverage of an OIS involving an unarmed citizen to be more negative. It is possible
that smaller departments enjoy a different type of relationship with their local media that insulates them
from the type of scrutiny that is placed on larger agencies by national media outlets (Chermak & Weiss,
2005; Matusiak, 2019). In addition, an OIS is likely not as novel within large departments. Whereas a fatal
OIS represents a relatively infrequent occurrence for many small departments, larger departments might
12
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not expect a shooting to alter media coverage since they occur more frequently. In larger cities, those
covered by major new organizations, the media may be more conditioned to shootings and more likely
to lend authority and legitimacy to the police department involved in the shooting (Hirschfield & Simon,
2010).
Counter to our expectations, executives from the largest agencies believed media coverage would be
less hostile if the officer fatally shot a Black suspect. Speculatively, we can think of a few possible explanations. One is that larger agencies are more likely to have non-White officers, and our experiment did
not specify the officer’s race. So, the executives in larger agencies may have been less likely to assume
that the OIS was interracial. Another possible explanation is that executives in larger agencies may have
more experience with Black-suspect OISs, given that bigger cities tend to have larger Black populations
than other locales. Alternatively, it may be that in larger cities, executives assume that a Black-suspect OIS
will be less newsworthy, especially if the suspect is armed, because violence against Black people is more
common generally—it may just be seen as “a fact of life,” in other words. Unfortunately, our sample size
was insufficient to test a three-way-interaction between the experimental factors and agency size. Future
research should explore this possibility. Finally, it may be that the surprising experimental finding was
simply due to chance. This explanation is the most likely in our view.
Another notable finding was the effect of the suspect being unarmed on decision-making among executives at mid-sized agencies. When the suspect was unarmed, executives in mid-sized agencies were
significantly less likely to indicate they would state publicly that the shooting was justified. This could
mean that agency size affects executives’ baseline views about the importance of communicating with the
public – or their baseline likelihood of perceiving shootings as justified – and that these baseline effects, in
turn, make executives in mid-sized agencies most sensitive to situational circumstances like the presence
of an unarmed suspect. Indeed, all else equal, the executives at the smallest agencies in our sample were the
most likely to believe it was important to state publicly that the hypothetical shooting was justified. One
protentional explanation is that OIS involving smaller agencies are less likely to influence chiefs’ willingness to be transparent because of OIS do not occur as frequently. In such agencies, therefore, situational
factors may simply have less room to influence executives’ decisions about public communication after
OIS.
Our experimental findings suggest that agency size may condition the effects of situational variables
on executive decision-making because it influences experiences with OIS and media coverage. With that
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in mind, it seems plausible that executives at larger agencies are more experienced in dealing with OIS
because their officers are more frequently involved in OIS (J. Jennings & Rubado, 2017; Smith, 2004). This
familiarity also provides a better understanding of the type of media coverage that typically follows OIS,
civilian injuries or deaths while in police custody, or other events that could potentially strain policecommunity relations. Future research should continue to explore situational differences in OIS and media
experiences across agencies of different sizes and locations, and how they affect executives’ and officers’
attitudes.
Our study was not without limitations. First, only 27 percent of our sample responded to the survey.
Although this response rate falls within the normal range for mail survey research of police samples (Nix,
Pickett, Baek, et al., 2019), it raises the possibility that nonresponse bias may undermine the external
validity of our findings. Second, Models 10 – 12 of Table 1 (which correspond to agencies in the 100+
sworn group) were slightly underpowered to detect medium-sized effects due to their smaller Ns. Third,
we presented the executives with a hypothetical vignette. This is a widely used method for analyzing
judgment and decision-making (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014; Pickett, Roche, et al., 2018; Reisig et al., 2018), and
our use of randomization enhances the internal validity of our design – but it is nevertheless artificial. We
also did not manipulate other relevant details, such as the presence of victims or witnesses (Garner et al.,
2002), dispatch priming (Taylor, 2019), or the suspect’s demeanor (Nix, Pickett, & Mitchell, 2019) – each
of which might factor into an executive’s assessment of the OIS and subsequent decision making. Future
research should explore whether these factors play a role in executives’ decision making as it relates to
release of BWC footage. Finally, our largest stratum (100+ officers) was more heterogenous in terms of
agency size than the other three. With that heterogeneity comes greater variation in other potentially
important factors, such as urbanicity or social context. As a result, the moderating effects of agency size
depicted in Figures 2 and 3 may reflect the effect of some unobserved factor that is correlated with agency
size – an observational variable – and that also moderates the effect of the experimental manipulations.
Additional analyses reported in Tables E1-E2 of the Supplemental Appendices suggest that variation in
each agency’s community population and violent crime rate do not alter our findings. Nevertheless, future
research might consider other factors such as agencies’ operating budgets or officer-involved shooting
rates. Future research should also consider a different sampling strategy that would permit distinguishing
agencies with, for example, 1,000+ officers from those with 100 to 500.
BWCs are now part of policing and we can expect that they are here to stay. Research demonstrates
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that both police and citizens support the use of BWCs (Gaub et al., 2018; McClure et al., 2017; Todak et al.,
2018; White & Malm, 2020). However, supporting their use is different than supporting the release of BWC
footage. As such, more empirical attention is needed to understand views about release of footage, and the
response to that footage (Lum et al., 2019). Our study shows that only a minority of police executives in the
United States support a law mandating video release. Our findings also reveal that agency size influences
police executives’ decisions about BWC and OIS, moderating the effects of situational factors, such as the
presence of an unarmed suspect. These findings give rise to two new research questions: 1) what specific
concerns motivate executives’ opposition to releasing BWC footage? and 2) what agency- and city-level
factors give rise to the heterogeneous, situational effects observed herein? We hope that future studies will
address these questions and continue to hone the measures introduced in this paper, as we found evidence
that the measurement quality of our additional communication item varied across stratum (see Table B1
of supplemental appendices). Specifically, researchers should attempt to replicate our methods and build
on them by varying important contextual details surrounding the incident. More generally, we call on
scholars to devote greater theoretical and empirical attention to the various public-communication issues
surrounding BWC and OIS.
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